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DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

WHO HAS THE BURDEN OF PROOF IN SETTING ASIDE
RELEASES EXECUTED BY INJURED RAILROAD EMPLOYEES?
By
Professors John Warren Giles' and Howard Newcomb Morsea
When a railroad employee, after an injury, executes a general release to the
railroad and subsequently institutes an action for the injuries received, who bears
the burden of proving that the release represented a fair settlement to the railtoad employee? This question was decided by the Supreme Court of the United
States in 1948 in Callen v. Pennsylvania Railroad,3 which holds that the burden
of proving the release invalid is incumbent upon the railroad employee. The decision was close as four dissenting justices were inclined to the opinion that releases
under the Federal Employers' Liability Act' should be governed by the same
rule which applies to releases executed by seamen in admiralty, namely, that
the burden of proving the release valid rests upon the shipping company. The
minority of the Court approved the reasoning contained in the opinion of Judge
Jerome Frank in Ricketts v. Pennsylvania Railroad' in 1946.
In the Callen case the railroad employee, subsequent to the injury and prior
to the commecnement of suit, executed a general release to the raiload for the sum of
$250.00. The release was executed in reliance upon the claim agent's assurance that
"There was nothing wrong" and that he "could get back on the, job." The claim
agent admitted, firstly, that at the time of the settlement he did not know that the
injured railroad employee was suffering from the injury which was described at the
trial, and secondly, that the railroad had not procured any medical examination
of the railroad employee. The claim agent testified that he determined the amount
of the settlement on the basis of his belief that there was no liability. The railroad employee obtained a jury verdict for the sum of $24,990.00, which was
reversed by the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, the Supreme
Court of the United States affirming such reversal and remanding the case for
a new trial.
In the Ricketts case a railroad dining car waiter was injured and later signed a general release, but subsequently claimed that he had executed the release
under a misapprehension that the release was intended by him to apply only to
tips and wages which he had lost and not to the injuries which he had received.
The Court set aside the release.
The rule relating to seamen was announced by the Supreme Court of the
I LL. B., Columbia University; Member of the Bar of the States of New York, Ohio, and
Illinois; Professor of Law, The John Marshall Law School, Chicago.
2 LL. B., Tulane University; Member of the Bar of the State of Georgia; Professor of Law,
The John Marshall Law School, Chicago.
3 92 L. Ed. 235 (1948).
4 U.S.C.A. chap. 3073, 34 Stat. 232; U.S.C.A. chap. 149, 35 Stat. 65; U.S.C.A. chap. 143,
36 Stat. 291.
5 153 F. 2d 757 (1946).

NOTES

United States in 1942 in Garrett v. Aloore-McCormack Company,S in which case
the Court explained at length the reason why seamen should be treated in a
special category, that any release executed by seamen should be scrutinized carefully by the Court, and that the burden of proving the validity of such a release in all cases is incumbent upon the shipping company.
A definite attempt was made by counsel representing the United Railroad
Workers of America, C. 1. 0., who filed a brief in the Callen case on behalf
of the Union, to persuade the Supreme Court of the United States to adopt the
same rule with respect to railroad employees that it had adopted with respect
to seamen. The Union argued that the railroad's position in the type of suit
involved was particularly strong because it could wait and refuse to make any
settlement whatsoever until such cases had run the gauntlet of the appellate courts.
The Union called attention to the fact that, as the result of this situation, a railroad family in which the head of the family had been injured or killed might
find itself in a position where it was without means of support for two or
three years, pending the outcome of the litigation. It mentioned that, as the
result of this economic strain, a railroad worker is often induced to make a
settlement for a nominal sum in order to obtain funds with which to meet his
immediate bills. The Union also pointed out that a railroad wcrker, when he
is disabled, wishes to return to work as soon as possible in order to retain his
seniority and his position on the payroll. For these reasons the Union sought
to persuade the Supreme Court of the United States to hold that the burden
of establishing the validity of a release be transferred from the railroad employee
to the railroad, and called attention to the fact that since the railroad has superior
facilities for determining injuries, it is in a better position to examine all the
facts from a legal and medical standpoint and to determine with considerable
certainty the probabilities of both speedy recovery and permanent disability.
Counsel for the injured man in the Callen case sought to persuade the Court
that such a release, for a nominal sum, was violative of Section 5 of the Federal
Employers' Liability Act which provides in substance that any contract to enable
any common carrier to "exempt itself from any liability created by this chapter
shall to that extent be void." The Court would not adopt this position, taking
the view that a release is not "a device to exempt from liability but is a means
of compromising a claimed liability and to that extent recognizing its possibility."
The Court further stated that "where controversies exist as to whether there is
liability, and if so, for how much, Congress has not said that the parties may
not settle their claims without litigation." Thus, the Court held that it was for
the Congress rather than the courts to amend the Federal Employers' Liability
Act on this point, and that wihout such an amendment the Supreme Court
of the United States must hold that the burden of proof of setting aside a
release rests upon the injured railroad employee.
We now have a situation whereby the Supreme Court of the United States
6 317 U. S. 239 (1942),
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has ruled that the burden of proof is on the railroad employee. But we also
have outstanding the thoughtful opinion of Judge Frank in the Ricketts case
which is opposed to the view of the Supreme Court and which may go far in
influencing any possible amendment to the Federal Employers' Liability Act.
Much has been written in favor of the premise that an injured railroad
employee is not in a secure position to protect his interests when he is dealing
with a powerful business organization such as a railroad. Other employees are
protected by Wokmen's Compensation Acts which provide for governmental supervision of settlements. What the injured railroad employee fears most is the
long, protracted litigation which he realizes the railroad has the power and resources to wage, and when considering a prompt settlement he is more influenced
by this fact than by any other save that of the necessity of meeting his current
expenses which have been augmented by his disability and requisite medical
care. The opinion of Judge Frank, therefore, sets forth a social policy which cannot be disregarded, especially in the light of the liberal policies of the present
administration and its indulgent attitude toward organized labor. Judge Frank
recognizes the fact that railroad employees, when they are injured, are at the
mercy of the railroad company, and after analyzing the complicated legal aspects
of the situation, he concludes that the liberal social policy which has been accorded to seamen is a policy which should be accorded to railroad employees as well.
Does this decision of the Supreme Court of the United States have any
practical interest to Claim Departments at the present time? We submit that
the closeness of the decision indicates clearly that whenever the opportunity presents itself the Supreme Court of the United States will look with careful scrutiny
upon any general releases which are executed by injured railroad employees.
However, there is a well-defined school of thought in the claim world which
subscribes to the belief that a release is a release and that it is wise policy to
procure a release even though it might be later set aside for any good and
sufficient reason. This school of thought is now fortified by the Callen case so
far as proof of validity is concerned. On the other hand, should Judge Frank's
theory some day prevail, quick settlements might result in many an idle ceremony.
Counsel for the Pennsylvania Railroad warned the Court in the Ricketts
case that if a release was executed by a railroad employee after advice of counsel,
and in the absence of fraud on the part of the railroad, and later was disregarded by the courts, the railroads never would settle with their employees. Judge
Frank dismisses this as a "glib prediction based on no evidence" and calls attention to the dire prophesies of counsel in 1894 who predicted that a Federal
Income Tax Law would usher in a communistic regime in this country. 7
Whatever the future position of the Supreme Court of the United States
on this question, the trend to protect the employee whenever possible is evident,
and it would seem wise for claim agents to become cognizant of the necessity
for the exercise of greater caution in the quick settlement of claims.
"
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